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Liberals vs Romantics:
Challenges of an Emerging
Corporate International
Criminal Law
Carsten Stahn
Holding bystanders and corporate agents accountable for
international crimes is often at the periphery of international
criminal justice. Based on its liberal foundations, international
criminal law has traditionally been strongly centered on
individual agency. In the industrialist cases after World War II,
individual criminal responsibility was used to demonstrate and
sanction corporate involvement in crime. Ideas of corporate
criminal responsibility have been voiced in the post-war era and
in the context of the negotiations of the Statute. In recent years,
they have witnessed a renaissance in several contexts: the
jurisprudence of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Malabo
Protocol of the African Union and the Draft Articles of the
International law Commission on Crimes Against Humanity.
This contribution examines the strengths and weaknesses of
individualized and collective approaches towards corporate
wrongdoing. It argues that the way forward requires less
‘romanticism’ and more realism. The appropriate space of
corporate criminal responsibility needs to be defined better. The
concept is still most developed in domestic jurisdictions. Its role
at the international level is likely to remain modest. The main
challenge is to develop the interplay between individual and
collective responsibility, and to assess more carefully in what
areas and in what forums collective responsibility may be
pursued best.



Professor of International Criminal Law and Global Justice, Leiden
University.

91

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018)
Liberals vs Romantics

Contents
I.

Introduction .............................................................................92

II, The pluralist legal architecture ...............................................94
III. Two competing schools In International Criminal Law ...........97
IV. Extending Individual Criminal Responsibility of Corporate
Agents .................................................................................... 105
A. The enforcement dilemma ............................................................. 107
B. The scope of liability ..................................................................... 108
1. Perpetration .................................................................................. 109
2 The controversy over aiding and abetting ..................................... 111
3. Common purpose liability ............................................................. 116
4. Superior responsibility ................................................................... 116
C. Critiques ...................................................................................... 119
V. Merits and Risks of Corporate Criminal Responsibility.......... 120
A. The case for corporate criminal responsibility .................................. 120
B. Caveats ........................................................................................ 121
VI. Concluding Reflections ........................................................... 124

I.

Introduction

The legal regime governing criminal liability of corporations is in
flux.1 There is a strong moral case to provide greater attention to the

1

See Desislava Stoichkova, TOWARDS CORPORATE LIABILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2010); Caroline
Kaeb, The Shifting Sands of Corporate Liability Under International
Criminal Law, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 351 (2016) (discussing
evolving trends of corporate liability in international law); See also
Robert C. Thompson, Anita Ramasastry &; Mark B. Taylor,
Translating UNOCAL: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business
Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 841 (2009)(discussing the Unocal case and its impact on changing
corporate liability); Daniel Leader, Business and Human Rights - Time
to Hold Companies to Account, 8 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 447 (2008)
(discussing changes in international criminal law regarding holding
businesses accountable for criminal offenses); Andrew Clapham, The
Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law over Legal
Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International
Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 (Menno T. Kamminga &; Saman Zia Zarifi
eds., Kluwer Law International 2000) (discussing the changes in
jurisdiction over legal persons).; Larissa van den Herik, Corporations as
Future Subjects of the International Criminal Court: An Exploration of
the Counterarguments and Consequences, in FUTURE PERPSECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 350 (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van
den Herik eds., TMC Asser Press 2010) (discussing corporations
becoming future subjects of international criminal law). See also Celia
Wells, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (2nd ed., Oxford
University Press, 2001).
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contribution of businesses to conflict and crime. The human rights
accountability architecture has developed significantly over past
decades. Human rights were traditionally related to violations of
states against individuals, but private actors can hold positions of
power and control exceeding those of states. As Ronald C. Slye has
argued:
“The rise of the corporation is analogous to the rise of the
modern nation-state—both unite individuals for a common
purpose, and both result in entities with an enormous potential
for good or ill.”2

International companies have played a critical role in extracting or
selling natural resources from conflict zones since colonial times. For
instance, Belgium ruler King Leopold famously exploited the Congo
through the use of concession companies, which used forced labor to
extract natural resources.3 Colonial powers justified such practices by
moral and technological supremacy and the promise of access to free
trade. During World War II, and in contemporary conflicts,
companies have played a major role in supporting and facilitating
warfare. In modern times, corporate actors have been involved in
violations in several ways: as direct perpetrator of violations, through
supply of goods that fuel international crimes, as providers of
information or services that facilitate crimes, or through investments
in conflict environments.4
The rise of the business and human rights movement5 over past
decades, contributed to creating a thicker accountability structure.
International law has become hostile to the idea that a collective

2.

Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal
Liability, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 955, 961 (2008).

3.

See ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED,
TERROR AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 117, 119, 125 (First Mariner
Books ed. 1999) (recounting colonial times under King Leopold).

4.

See Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational
Corporations and International Law: Where from Here, 19 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 1, 7-8 (2003) (general discussion on MNCs various violations).

5.

See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework, OFF.
OF
THE
U.N.
HIGH
COMM’R
FOR
HUM.
RTS.
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusin
essHR_EN.pdf (outlining UN standards of international business). ).
See generally Larissa van den Herik and Jernej Letnar Černič,
Regulating Corporations under International Law: From Human Rights
to International Criminal Law and Back Again 8 J. Int’l Crim. Just.
7125 (2010).
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company structure provides a veil against accountability’. 6 There is a
rich compliance web for human rights violations that includes not
only hard law, but soft law and voluntary compliance mechanisms.
Violations can be subject to wide a range of sanctions, including the
revocation of licenses (i.e. the ‘corporate death penalty’ for legal
persons), temporary license suspension, the initiation of investigations
and prosecutions, civil or administrative penalties, and warning or
persuasion techniques. 7 At least three major liability regimes can
hold companies legally accountable: civil liability, human rights
accountability, and criminal responsibility. All of them expanded over
time, yet the dividing lines are not always clear. There is, in
particular, a deeper controversy about the limits of human rights
accountability and the feasible reach of criminal responsibility. 8

II, The pluralist legal architecture
The idea that “companies cannot commit offences” (societas
delinquere non potest) is a relic of the past.9 Early criminalization
started in response to the industrial revolution. Many of the
traditional theoretical objections against corporate criminal
responsibility, such as the difficulty to ascribe mens rea to a juridical
person or to inflict punishment have been addressed. Shifts from a
naturalistic to a more sociological vision of crime make it possible to

6.

The image of the ‘corporate veil’ is often used to strengthen the case for
accountability. On the role of metaphors, see Maks Del Mar, Metaphor
in International Law: Language, Imagination and Normative Inquiry 86
Nordic Journal of International Law 170 (2017).

7.

On penalties, see Art. 10 (4) of the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime. It states: Each State Party shall, in
particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with this
article are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or
non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.

8.

For a critique of corporate criminal responsibility, see Vikramaditya S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?
109 Harvard Law Review 1477-1534 (1996); John Hasnas, The
Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal
Liability 46 American Criminal Law Review 1329 (2009).

9.

See Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporations -A Study
of the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19
U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 38, 40-41, (1957) (discussing the contemporary
rejection of the historical concept that legal persons are unable to form a
mens rea or to be subject to criminal liability); See also Andrew
Clapham, Extending International Criminal Law Beyond the Individual
to Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups, 6 J. INT’L L. 899 (2008)
(discussing application, by contemporary courts across the globe, of
mens rea requirements to corporate entities).
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argue that corporations can perpetrate crimes,10 but the legal regime
is highly fragmented.
Domestic legal systems diverge in their approaches. Common law
jurisdictions generally recognize corporate criminal responsibility.
Continental legal traditions are more diverse. Many jurisdictions allow
for corporate criminal responsibility, either in general or for specific
offences.11 Other countries (e.g., Italy, Germany, Ukraine) remain
more skeptical to the concept and resort to administrative offences or
penalties to address wrongdoing.12 Some systems combine civil and
criminal proceedings.13 This allows victims to link criminal charges
against corporate defendants to tort claims.14 At the international
level, there are seventeen multilateral international instruments with
provisions on corporate criminal liability, including the UN
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.15 These
instruments recognize the potential responsibility of legal persons. But
they leave it largely in the discretion of states to determine the
appropriate kind of sanctions. This approach was recently followed by
the International Law Commission (ILC) in its work on crimes
against humanity. It decided to include a provision on legal persons in
its draft articles on Crimes against Humanity in light of the ‘the
potential involvement of legal persons in acts committed as part of a

10.

As Bert Swart has noted, they ‘do not act in a physical, but they
routinely decide whether or not natural persons will perform physical
acts on their behalf’. See Bert Swart, International Trends Towards
Establishing Some Form of Punishment for Corporations, 6 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 947, 951 (2008).

11.

Kaeb, supra note 1, at 380-381.

12.

See OHCHR, Corporate liability for gross human rights abuses (2012),
32-33,
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/
DomesticLawRemedies/StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf.
See
also
Criminal Liability of Companies, LEX MUNDI, www.lexmundi.com/
Document.asp?DocID=1069 (outlining Italian legal criminal corporate
liability); See also Corporate and Commercial Disputes Review, NORTON
ROSE FULBRIGHT, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/ files/corporateand-commercial- disputes-review- issue-3- 138938.pdf (discussing
Germany corporate criminal liability); Sergiy Gryshko, Ukraine: Ukraine
Introduces Criminal Liability of Legal Entities Ahead of Schedule,
LEXOLOGY, https://perma.cc/MKR5-BDJ4
(discussing Ukrainian
corporate criminal liability).

13.

See Kaeb, supra note 1, at 386-387 (discussing hybrid civil-criminal
systems).

14.

Id.

15.

Swart, supra note 10, at 949; G.A. Res. 55/25, United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Art. 10 ¶1-4 (Nov.
15, 2000).
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widespread or systematic
population’.16 It states that

attack

directed

against

a

civilian

[s]ubject to the provisions of its national law, each State shall
take measures, where appropriate, to establish the liability of
legal persons for the offences referred to in this draft article.
Subject to the legal principles of the State, such liability of legal
persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.17

Criminal responsibility of legal persons cannot be determined in the
same way as that of natural persons. The methods differ across
criminal traditions. Some theories attribute the conduct of agents to
the company as a legal person.18 Criminal responsibility is thus
derived from the criminal acts of agents, i.e. corporate officers and
senior managers (attribution model).19 It is necessary to inquire
whether the agent committed the offence, and whether that conduct
can be ascribed to the corporation based on a relationship to the
agent. The criteria used for attribution differ. The weakness of this
model is that it poses causality problems in collective and
decentralized networks. Newer theories admit that the conduct of
agents is determined by corporate cultures and collective decisionmaking processes, and take into account the aggregated knowledge of
agents.20 Others hold the company itself accountable for its own
wrongful conduct (organizational model).21 This approach takes into
account that collective failures such as poor organization or
communication may have caused the wrong. The organizational model
thus ties responsibility to organizational failures, such as lack of
proper organization or control. A classic example is a corporate
16.

See, ILC, Report of the International Law Commission’, GAOR 71th
Session, Supp No 10. UN Doc A/71/10 (2016), 264.

17.

See Art. 5 (7), ibid., 248. The language is based on Art. 3 (4) of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, adopted by
General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, entered
into force on 18 January 2002.

18.

See generally Clapham, supra note 1 (discussion on legal persons and
theories of criminal liability).

19.

Thomas Weigend, Societas Delinquere Non Potest?: A German
Perspective, 6 J. INT’L L. 927, 931-933 (2009).

20.

On the ‘aggregation model’, see Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing
Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation Toward
Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 Buffalo Criminal Law
Review 641, 661 (2000).

21.

See generally Cristina De Maglie, Models of Corporate Criminal
Liability in Comparative Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 547
(2005) (discussing different levels of accountability and organizational
models).
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culture that facilitates violations.22 Corporate mens rea is inferred
from the aggregated knowledge of agents. This approach forces
companies to put in place adequate structures to prevent illegal
conduct, in order to escape from criminal responsibility.

III. Two competing schools In International Criminal
Law
In international criminal law, the idea of corporate criminal
responsibility is less developed than at the domestic level.
International criminal law has traditionally concerned itself with the
responsibility of individuals.23 Neither the Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals, nor the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and Rwanda (ICTR) or the International Criminal Court (ICTR)
were formally vested with the authority to try legal persons.24 In
national jurisdictions, courts have found business corporations
complicit in gross human rights violations.25 Company against may be
held accountable in several ways: as perpetrators of violations, (for
instance use of forced labor or pillaging of resources), as accomplices,
or as military or civilian superiors (e.g., private security companies).
But it is increasingly questioned whether the individualized approach
towards criminal responsibility responds fully to challenges of business
involvement in crime. In many instances, it is difficult to tie corporate
crime to an individual actor. As Thomas Weigend has noted:
“It is not a single individual who sells poison gas to a dictator
to be used in war crimes, but it is a firm, organized as a legal
person that is the provider of the gas. It is not a single
individual who buys and re-sells stolen diamonds and thus lends
critical financial support to a dictatorial regime, but an
enterprise specialized in such lucrative deals.”26

The ambition to extend criminal responsibility coincides not only with
the human rights-driven anti-impunity movement, but also with
broader structural critiques of international criminal law. For
instance, critical legal scholars and third world approaches to
22.

Id. at 557-560; See e.g. Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) S 12.4 (Austl.)
(Australian statute penalizing legal persons for conduct of unsupervised
employees, agents, or officers).

23.

Slye, supra note 2, at 1.

24.

Stahn, supra note 1, at 351, 354.

25.

See Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy
in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1239, (2009) (discussing court rulings regarding
gross human rights violations of corporations).

26.

Weigend, supra note 19 at 927-928..
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International Law have long criticized the strong focus of
international criminal justice on atrocity violence and its neglect of
the socio-economic causes of conflict and broader issues of everyday
violence.27 Strengthening criminal responsibility of corporations and
businesses responds to an ever stronger claim to penalize economic
drivers of conflict, including Western companies and transnational
networks. 28
A symbolic moment is the famous decision of the Appeals
Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon against a Lebanese
media company in the Al-Jadeed case.29 It marks the first decision in
which a hybrid criminal tribunal held a corporation criminally liable
for contempt of court. The reasoning is filled with historical references
and normative ambition. The Chamber noted:
“corporate liability for serious harms is a feature of most of the
world’s legal systems and therefore qualifies as a general
principle of law… Corporate criminal liability is on the verge of
attaining, at the very least, the status of a general principle of
law applicable under international law.”30

The Al-Jadeed opinion represents an old cosmopolitan dream, namely
to decouple international criminal law from its traditional ties to state
policy. The decision challenges the individualist tradition of
international law.31 It deviates from the classical Nuremberg paradigm
27.

See Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to
International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77, 91 (2003) (discussing critiques of legal scholars
and third world approaches to international criminal justice); See
Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporations Before International Criminal Courts:
Implications for International Criminal Justice Project, 30 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 221, 222-23 (2017) (discussing the historical tendency of
international criminal justice to inadequately addresses economic crimes
and actors).

28.

William A. Schabas, War Economies, Economic Actors and
International Criminal Law, in PROFITING FROM PEACE: MANAGING THE
RESOURCE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL WAR 425, 425-443 (K. Ballentine and
H. Nitzschke eds., 2005).

29.

See Prosecutor v. Al Khayat, Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/ARI26.1,
Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in
Contempt Proceedings, ¶ 27 (Special Trib. For Lebanon Oct. 2, 2014)
(discussing the decision of the Al-Jadeed case).

30.

Id. at ¶ 67.

31.

See Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal
Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L., 561, 594 (2002) (critiquing the historical
approach of international law and stating “by focusing on individual
responsibility, criminal law reduces the perspective of the phenomenon
to make it easier for the eye. Thereby it reduces the complexity and
scale of multiple responsibilities to a mere background.”).
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according to which “crimes against international law are committed
by men, not by abstract entities.”32 It argues that the famous
Nuremberg passage was an obiter dictum and not meant to foreclose
responsibility of corporations as abstract entities under international
law.33 It reflects a deeper clash, between what George Fletcher has
called “liberal” and “romantic” approaches towards collective
responsibility.34 A liberal conception of responsibility focuses on
individual agency and abstracts individual wrong from collective
action. The romantic view admits that international crimes are
typically by their very nature committed in collectivities, and thus
closely connected to some degree of collective will.
The two traditions have been in conflict since the naissance of
international criminal law. In the aftermath of World War II, the
links between business and regime crime were investigated before
military tribunals of the Allied Forces. German industrial agents, such
as IG Farben, Krupp, or Flick faced charges for complicity in war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression in trials under
Control Council Law No. 10. The tribunals intensely discussed
theories of corporate criminal responsibility, but took a pragmatic
stance. They found that private individuals could be held responsible
under international law,35 but they did not try corporations as such.
In the IG Farben trial (Carl Krauch and Twenty-Two Others),
thirteen members of IG Farben, were found guilty of enslavement or
plunder. The US Military tribunal held:
“It is appropriate here to mention that the corporate defendant,
Farben, is not before the bar of this Tribunal and cannot be
subjected to criminal penalties in these proceedings. We have
used the term “Farben” as descriptive of the instrumentality of
32.

United States v. Goring, Trial of The Major War Criminals Before the
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, ¶ 223 (Int’l Military Trib.
For Nuremberg, Germany, Nov. 14, 1945-Oct. 1, 1946).

33.

Al Khayat, supra note 29 at ¶ 64.

34.

See George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at
War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1504
(2002)(discussing this approach to collective responsibility and guilt of
nations).

35.

See United States v. Flick, U.S. Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Trials of
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Judgment,
1191 (Dec.22, 1947) (“International law, as such, binds every citizen just
as does ordinary municipal law. Acts adjudged criminal when done by
an officer of the government are criminal also when done by a private
individual. The guilt differs only in magnitude, not in quality. The
offender in either case is charged with personal wrong and punishment
falls on the offender in propria persona. The application of international
law to individuals is no novelty. There is no justification for a limitation
of responsibility to public officials”).
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cohesion in the name of which the enumerated acts of spoliation
were committed. But corporations act through individuals and,
under the conception of personal individual guilt to which
previous reference has been made, the prosecution, to discharge
the burden imposed upon it in this case, must establish by
competent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual
defendant was either a participant in the illegal act or that,
being aware thereof, he authorized or approved it.”36

Defendants were charged symbolically as company leaders and
individuals to demonstrate the economic power behind Nazi atrocities.
The idea of corporate criminal responsibility was discussed since
the 1950s, but its feasibility for an international criminal jurisdiction
remained contested. In the context of the negotiations of the ICC
Statute, the concept of corporate criminal responsibility was
controversial.37 Some delegations rejected the idea on the ground that
‘‘there was no criminal responsibility which could not be traced back
to individuals.’’38 Others supported it.39 The discussions addressed a
broad number of practical scenarios, such as involvement of
companies in arms trade fueling conflict, their role in covering up of
crime sites through construction work, or their indirect contribution
to forcible transfer of persons. France proposed a compromise
solution. Corporate criminal responsibility was made dependent on
individual criminal responsibility. The scope of responsibility was
limited and conditional. It required a conviction of a company agent
for acts carried out ‘on behalf of and with the explicit consent’ of the
company concerned. The proposal read:
“Without prejudice to any individual criminal responsibility of
natural persons under this Statute, the Court may also have
jurisdiction over a juridical person under this Statute. Charges
may be filed by the Prosecutor against a juridical person, and
the Court may render a judgement over a judicial person for the
crime charged, if:
36.

Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, The U.N. War Crimes
Commission, Volume X, 52 (1949).

37.

Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporate Criminal Liability and the ICC Statute:
The Comparative Law Challenge, 56 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 333,
336–39 (2009)(discussing the ambiguity in the ICC Statute which caused
alternative accountability mechanisms).

38.

See JERNEJ LETNAR CERNIC, CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A PLURAL AND DIVERSE DUTYBEARER REGIME, 85 (Wouter Vandenhole ed., 2015) (discussing Greece’s
idea of corporate criminal responsibility).

39.

See generally THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING
FORWARD, LOOKING BACK, 210 (Jena Martin & Karen E. Bravo eds.,
2016)
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(a) The charges filed by the Prosecutor against the natural
person and the juridical person allege the matters referred to in
subparagraphs (b) and (c); and
(b) The natural person charged was in a position of control
within the juridical person under the national law of the State
where the juridical person was registered at the time the crime
was committed; and
(c) The crime was committed by the natural person acting on
behalf of and with the explicit consent of that juridical person
and in the course of its activities; and
(d) The natural person has been convicted of the crime
charged.”40

The proposal was primarily guided by a functional objective, namely
to increase the chances of victims to obtain compensation through the
ICC reparation regime. It represented a compromise between the
‘liberal’ and the romantic view. It went too far for those who
remained opposed to the idea of extending criminal responsibility
beyond moral fault and individual culpability of agents.41 It did not
go far enough for those who claim that corporate criminality cannot
be reduced to individuals.42 It also faced pragmatic concerns. Skeptics
feared that corporate criminal responsibility would overburden the
ICC and make criminal trials longer and more expensive.43 The option
of civil or administrative responsibility of legal persons was not
thoroughly discussed.
40.

U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Summary Records of the Plenary
Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, ¶ 5, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.183/C.1/WGGP/L.5/Rev.2 (Vol. II), (June 15- July 17,
1998).

41.

Weigend, supra note 19 at 927-928.

42.

BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME &
ACCOUNTABILITY, 45-46, (Cambridge University Press 1996); See e.g.
Joanna Kyriakakis, Australian Prosecution of Corporations for
International Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST, 809, 825 (2007) (“Features
such as the commonly opaque nature of accountability within corporate
structures, the expendability of individuals, the practice of corporate
separation of those responsible for past violations and those responsible
for preventing future offences, as well as the safe harbouring within
corporations of individual suspects, can all contribute to the difficulty of
locating individual wrongdoers, as well undermining any deterrent value
of prosecution”).

43.

Cf. David Scheffer, Corporate Liability under the Rome Statute, 57
HARV. INT’L L. J., Spring 2016 at 35 (noting the lack of support among
national jurisdiction to justify the inclusion of corporate criminal
liability in the Rome Statute).
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Today, there are two competing schools. One school seeks to
increase corporate accountability trough an expansion and refinement
of individual responsibility. It is grounded in the liberal tradition of
international criminal justice.44 It is based on the hypothesis that
involvement in atrocity crimes results from the interaction of selfdetermined individuals in collective structures and specific situational
factors that drive individual agency.45 It cautions against the risks of
overbroad standards of attribution in punishment and an excessive
use of criminal law as an instrument to seek corporate compliance
with the law.46
The second school, the romantic approach sees virtue in holding
artificial legal persons accountable as collective entities.47 It is more
closely connected to the human rights tradition. It postulates that “no
person, natural or legal, should be placed above the law or be allowed
to operate outside of the rule of law.”48 This view accepts that the
blameworthiness of the behavior of corporations may exceed the
responsibility of individual.49 It places the emphasis on the
responsibility of a corporation as an autonomous agent.50 It relies on
the premise that corporations enjoy a degree of functional autonomy
that allows them to determine their own objectives, organizational
structure and social identity and to make choices about the law.51 It is
most vividly reflected in the passionate argument of the STL Appeals
Chamber:
“[M]odern history is replete with examples where great harm
has been caused by corporations with the advantages that result
44.

See generally Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International
Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. OF IN’TL L. 925 (2008) for a discussion of
the liberal tradition of international criminal justice.

45.

Kyriakakis, supra note 37 at 345-346.

46.

Robinson, supra note 44, at 927-29, 938.

47.

See Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a
Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with Political
Realism, 31 HUM. RTS. Q., No. 3, 624 (Aug. 2009)(noting the general
characteristics of judicial romanticism); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations
and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J.
443, 461 (2001).

48.

Al Khayat, supra note 29 at ¶ 84.

49.

See id. at ¶ 82 (noting corporations’ greater “power, influence and
reach” than individuals corresponds to a greater responsibility which has
not materialized in corporations’ actions).

50.

See id. at ¶ 83-4 (highlighting the differences between prosecuting
corporations and individuals and the accountability of corporation as an
entity).

51.

See id. at ¶ 82-3 (emphasizing the characteristics of corporations which
make them difficult to prosecute in the same manner as individuals).
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from the recognition of their status as legal persons […] In such
a scenario, there can exist circumstances where the Tribunal
may be unable, due to the complexity of corporate structures,
internal operating processes, and the aggregate effect of the
actions of many individuals, to identify and apprehend the most
responsible natural persons within a corporation. Similarly, the
prosecution of natural persons, rather than the legal persons
that they serve, would fail to underline and punish corporate
cultures that condone and in some cases encourage illegal
behaviour. Punishing only natural persons in such circumstances
would be a poor response where the need for accountability lies
beyond anyone person.”52

The scholarly reception of the STL approach reflects the clash
between the liberal and the romantic view. Some have welcomed it as
a step in the right direction, namely as “a foundation for further
development of liability of corporate entities in international criminal
law”.53 Others have decried it as a novel incarnation for international
criminal law’s “dream factory”.54
The recent adoption of the Malabo protocol55 has lent further
support to this approach. The protocol extends the jurisdiction of the
proposed African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples Rights to
“legal persons, with the exception of States.”56 It is the first statutory
52.

Id. at ¶ 82-3.

53.

Karlijn Van der Voort, Contempt case Against Lebanese Journalists at
the STL, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON BLOG (Apr. 30, 2014, 11:37
AM), https://perma.cc/Z7M4-3H9S.

54.

The Dream Factory Strikes Again: the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
recognizes International Criminal Corporate Liability, SPREADING THE
JAM (Apr. 28, 2014) https://dovjacobs.com/2014/04/28/the-dreamfactory-strikes-again-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon-recognizesinternational-criminal-corporate-liability/
[https://perma.cc/L9F4M8Z2].

55.

African Court of Justice and Human Rights, Protocol on Amendments
to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights, (Jun. 11, 2000).

56.

Amnesty Int’l, Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications of
the Merged and Expanded African Court, AFR 01/3063/2016, at 59
(2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr01/3063/2016/en/
[https://perma.cc/49Y2-4TBU] [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l]. Article 46C
reads:
1.

For the purpose of this Statute, the Court shall have
jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States.

2.

Corporate intention to commit an offence may be
established by proof that it was the policy of the
corporation to do the act which constituted the offence.
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instrument of a regional court that contains a specific article on
corporate criminal responsibility.57 It seeks to counter the de facto
impunity that many foreign corporations enjoyed in relation to human
rights violations on the continent, through the criminal responsibility
of legal persons. It is drafted in broader terms than the French ICC
proposal which derived responsibility from the control of company
agents. As Joanna Kyriakakis has noted, it follows the ‘organizational
model’:
“This means that, rather than focussing upon the conduct and
state of mind of specific individuals within the corporation and
deriving the corporation’s fault from there, corporate culpability
is instead deemed to be situated within the corporation itself.”58

It relates criminal responsibility directly to the company policies and
practices of the organization (e.g., policies of compliance, information
sharing systems), rather than acts and and state of mind of individual
corporate agents. Corporate criminal responsibility may thus exist,
irrespective of whether a natural person is held liable or convicted for
the conduct. The Protocol allows use of constructive knowledge as
proof, and provides that the collective (aggregated) knowledge of
company agents may be used to establish responsibility. The Protocol
does not require that the corporation must have caused or encouraged
3.

A policy may be attributed to a corporation where it
provides the most reasonable explanation of the conduct of
that corporation.

4.

Corporate knowledge of the commission of an offence may
be established by proof that the actual or constructive
knowledge of the relevant information was possessed within
the corporation.

5.

Knowledge may be possessed within a corporation even
though the relevant information is divided between
corporate personnel.

6.

The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude
the criminal responsibility of natural persons who are
perpetrators or accomplices in the same crimes.

57.

Fransizka
Oehm,
Thinking
Globally,
Acting
Globally,
VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (May 31, 2016), http:// voelkerrechtsblog.org/
thinking-globally-acting-globally-ii/ [https://perma.cc/Z25Y-RHN7].

58.

Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporate Criminal Liability at the African
Criminal Court Briefing Paper – ACRI Meeting, Arusha 2016, AFRICAN
COURT RESEARCH INITIATIVE, http://www.africancourtresearch.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/Kyriakakis_Briefing-Paper_-ACRI-2016Meeting.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY99-DY75] (last visited Sept. 27,
2017).
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the conduct. It was adopted quickly. It fails to define the concept of
‘legal person’, as well as applicable penalties. Not all legal issues may
have been fully thought through.59 It might even raise concerns
relating to over-criminalization of legal persons.
International criminal law is thus at a tipping point. The classical
view that international criminal law is a system without a space for
corporate criminal liability is under challenge. The future of corporate
liability has two potential pathways: Strengthening individualized
prosecution of corporate agents, or prosecuting corporate involvement
in crime through a collective organizational perspective. Both options
raise significant challenges. International criminal law has a stronger
stigma, and partly different rationales than human rights law.
Criminalization requires caution.60 Concepts from domestic law cannot
be automatically transposed.

IV. Extending Individual Criminal Responsibility of
Corporate Agents
One path to develop accountability is to develop the legal regime
concerning individual criminal responsibility of corporate agents. This
rationale is in line with the growing privatization of international
criminal. It is nowadays widely agreed that business corporations are
bound by the prohibitions relating to core crimes under international
law.61 Corporate actors have made direct and substantial contribution
to international crimes. Certain forms of economic crime have become
part of atrocity crime.
The legal regime has developed significantly since Nuremberg.
Many of the crime structures and principles of individual criminal
59.

See Larissa van den Herik and Elies van Sliedregt, International
Criminal Law and the Malabo Protocol: About Scholarly Reception,
Rebellion and Role Models, in Steven Dewulf, LIBER AMICORUM CHRIS
VAN DEN WYNGAERT (Maklu 2018) 511.

60.

See James G. Stewart, A Pragmatic Critique of Corporate Criminal
Theory: Lessons from the Extremity, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 261, 276
(2013) (explaining that corporate criminal liability may be too blunt in
some circumstances).

61.

Volker Nerlich, Core Crimes and Transnational Business Corporations,
8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 895 (2010), https://academic.oup.com/jicj/
article/8/3/895/876111/Core-Crimes-and-Transnational-Business
[https://perma.cc/BMX3-BXYA];
G.A.
Res.
3068
(XXVIII),
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, art. I (July 18, 1976), http://www.un.org/en/
genocideprevention/documents/atrocitycrimes/Doc.10_International%20
Convention%20on%20the%20Suppression%20and%20Punishment%20of
%20the%20Crime%20of%20Apartheid.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9RCNCGL] (expressly acknowledging the capacity of organizations and
institutions to commit the crime of apartheid).
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responsibility have been extended to capture conduct by private
actors. The ICC has made it clear since the outset that corporate
agents may face criminal responsibility for the use suppliers who
commit crimes under international law.62 It has received various
communications relating to business involvement in crime.63 In 2016,
the Office of the Prosecutor has devoted some attention to the
problems of economic involvement in conflict in its Policy Paper on
Case Selection and Prioritisation. The Paper states that the “impact
of the crimes may be assessed in light of the social, economic and
environmental damage inflicted on the affected communities.”64 It
mentions specific categories of crimes that are typically under
prosecuted, namely
“crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter
alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation
of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land.” 65

This statement did not mention business accountability specifically,
but had a strong expressivist effect.66 It triggered a wave of
communications relating to land grabbing in Cambodia and corporate
62.

Press Release, ICC Prosecutor, Communications Received by the Office
of the Prosecutor of the ICC (May 16, 2003), https://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B080A3DD-7C69-4BC9-AE25-0D2C271A9A63/
277502/16_july__english.pdf [https://perma.cc/75Q9-2NFV]( [T]he
Prosecutor believes that investigation of the financial aspects of the
alleged atrocities will be crucial to prevent future crimes and for the
prosecution of crimes already committed. If the alleged business
practices continue to fuel atrocities, these would not be stopped even if
current perpetrators were arrested and prosecuted. The Office of the
Prosecutor is establishing whether investigations and prosecutions on
the financial side of the alleged atrocities are being carried out in the
relevant countries).

63.

Lachlan Markay, ICC Won’t Prosecute Chevron, THE WASHINGTON
FREE BEACON (Apr. 2, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://freebeacon.com/
issues/icc-wont-prosecute-chevron/ [https://perma.cc/3ESS-BW5N].

64.

Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and
Prioritisation,
¶
41
(Sept.
15,
2016),
https://www.icccpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_CaseSelection_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FSR-WZ9Z] [hereinafter Policy
Paper] (emphasis added).

65.

Id.

66.

See Nadia Bernaz, An Analysis of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s
Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization from the Perspective
of Business and Human Rights, 15 J. IN’TL CRIM. JUST. 527 (July 1,
2017), https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/doi/10.1093/jicj/mqx031/
4080836/An-Analysis-of-the-ICC-Office-of-the-Prosecutors
[https://perma.cc/KP7T-9CU5](explaining that the policy paper could
lead to a “surge of communications referring to business related
crimes”).
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involvement in crimes against asylum seekers in detention centers in
Nauru and Manus Island.67 In May 2017, a coalition of human rights
groups requested the Prosecutor to investigate corporate complicity of
Chiquita Brands executives in crimes against humanity committed by
Colombian paramilitaries.68 But, extending individual criminal
responsibility faces several challenges.
A.

The enforcement dilemma

The first challenge is the enforcement dilemma. Business related
prosecutions happen at a comparatively low rate.69 Domestic
jurisdictions can prosecute corporate agents, irrespective of whether
the company is in incorporated in their jurisdiction. States, however,
are often reluctant to engage in investigations and prosecutions
against foreign agents, due to fears of negative economic consequences
or dependence on foreign investment, or difficulties to obtain
evidence. 70 Crimes are often part of a larger supply chain that is
difficult to establish or linked to violations that do not cross the
threshold of international crimes. The underlying cases are complex in
legal terms, due to the need to establish the nexus between the agent
and the crime and to prove the necessary mental element. They may
require significant resources and exceed the capacity of local courts.
Universal jurisdiction cases are rare. 71 Cases are usually initiated by

67.

See Communiqué to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court Under Article 15 of the Rome Statute, The Situation in
Nauru and Manus Island: Liability for Crimes against Humanity in the
Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, at 96, 103 (February 14,
2017),
https://www.academia.edu/31462935/The_Situation_in_Nauru_and_
Manus_Island_Liability_for_crimes_against_humanity_in_the_deten
tion_of_refugees_and_asylum_seekers [https://perma.cc/2DF3-GC44]
(explaining the corporate involvement in crimes in Nauru and Manus
Island).

68.

See FIDH, ‘Human Rights Coalition Calls on ICC to Investigate Role of
Chiquita Executives in Contributing to Crimes against Humanity’, 18
May 2017, at https://www.fidh.org/en/region/americas/colombia/
human-rights-coalition-calls-on-icc-to-investigate-role-of-chiquita.

69.

See Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges
of Prosecuting Corporate Officials whose Business Transactions
Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 56 A.F.L. REV.
167, 169 (2005) (explaining the “hesitance to prosecute people for just
‘doing business’”).

70.

For a recent survey, see Dieneke de Vos, Corporate Responsibility for
International Crimes, Just Security, 30 November 2017, at
https://www.justsecurity.org/47452/corporate-criminal-accountabilityinternational-crimes/.

71.

On the Dutch situation, see WODC, DUTIES OF CARE OF DUTCH
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
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the national state of the offender, or the territorial state. Moreover,
powerful states often have less political incentive to initiate cases for
atrocity crimes than classical economic offences, such as corruption.72
Prosecuting anti-corruption practices in foreign states reduces local
competitive advantages. It thus benefits the interests of foreign
investment. Atrocity crime prosecution may offer less material
benefits.
International criminal courts and tribunals are highly selective in
their selection of cases.73 Corporate involvement in crime has enjoyed
limited attention.74 In mass atrocity situations, Prosecutors try to
capture a blueprint of the criminality in a given conflict situation,
focusing on the most responsible leaders or the most serious crimes.75
Bystanders or economic drivers of conflict are often at the margins.76
Extending individual criminal responsibility of corporate agents would
require a slightly different prosecutorial strategy, namely a more
pronounced commitment to certain thematic prosecutions focused on
business criminality.
B.

The scope of liability

A second challenge is the legal approach towards network
criminality. In past decades, international criminal law has been
significantly developed to capture new types of criminality. It has
developed techniques to hold persons accountable who act remotely
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, December 2015, 10
(‘From the very limited
number of criminal cases in the ICSR context that the Public
Prosecutor’s Office has decided to prosecute, it seems to follow that the
Public Prosecutor’s Office does not opt for the prosecution of businessrelated human rights abuses in prioritizing the types of cases for which
to deploy the scarce means for criminal investigation and prosecution’).
The report is at https://www.wodc.nl/binaries/2531-summary_tcm28124392.pdf.

72.

Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigen, Corporate Responsibility Before
International Institutions, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1025, 1044
(2009).

73.

Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: Current Issues and
Perspectives, 64 WTR LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3 (2001).

74.

Bernaz, supra note 59.

75.

Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, at 3-7,
ICC-OTP (2003), https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/62W7-JHFF].

76.

See Otto Spijkers, Bystander Obligations at the Domestic and
International Level Compared, 6 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L LAW 47, 51
(2014),
http://www.gojil.eu/issues/61/61_article_spijkers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CEJ2-F9JH] (explaining why many States do not
hold bystanders legally responsible for standing idly by during a
criminal offense).
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from the scene of crime.77 There is a fundamental tension between
individual culpability and responsibility for involvement in collective
crime.
1.

Perpetration

It is uncontroversial that corporate agents may face direct
responsibility as perpetrators.78 For instance, private security
contractors or company officials may be held accountable if they
commit war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide.79 Classical
examples are sexual offences, torture, slave labor or modern types of
slavery that meet the definition of international crimes. For instance
after World War II, Flick and IG Farben officials were convicted for
using prisoners of war to meet their production quota.
One of the problems of determining responsibility as a perpetrator
is the collective and decentralized nature of decision-making processes
in corporate structures. International criminal law has developed
special doctrine to deal with system criminality. There are different
theories. In the Lubanga case, the ICC held that
“principals to a crime are not limited to those who, in spite of
being removed from the scene of the crime, control or
mastermind its commission because they decide whether and
how the offence will be committed.”80

This control theory has expanded to include “control over an
organization”. 81 In these cases, a perpetrator commits the crime
through another person by means of control over an organization. The
77.

See Hans Vest, Business Leaders and the Modes of Individual Criminal
Responsibility under International Law, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 851, 86465
(2010),
https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/8/3/851/876077/
Business-Leaders-and-the-Modes-of-Individual [https://perma.cc/Y62LUE8V] (“A person who contributes ‘in any other way’ to the . . .
commission of a crime ‘by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose’ will, according to Article 25(3)(d) ICC Statute, also incur
individual criminal responsibility”).

78.

C. Lehnhardt, Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under
International Criminal Law, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1015,1022 (2008).

79.

Id. at 1030.

80.

Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 920 (Jan. 29,2007), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF.

81.

Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the
Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, 07 March 2014, paras. 1404-1410.
See Jens David Ohlin, Elies van Sliedregt, and Thomas Weigend,
Assessing the Control-Theory , 26 LJIL 725 (2013); Neha Jain, The
Control Theory of Perpetration in International Criminal Law, 12
Chicago Journal of International Law 158 (2011).
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organizational theory has traditionally applied in the context of
crimes committed through hierarchical organizations of power.
German Scholar Claus Roxin developed the idea that a person who
leads a hierarchically structured military or political organization may
be held accountable as principal for crimes committed by subordinates
in that organization if he or she dominated the will of that
organization.82 The decisive criterion is whether the choice of members
of the organization is controlled through leadership. Roxin used three
criteria: the existence of hierarchical organizational structures that
facilitates rule determined processes, the exchangeable nature of the
members of the organizations, and a focus of organizational activity
that is outside the law. The classical example is state-organized
criminality. Roxin sought to capture crimes committed by Nazi
leaders through organizations such as the SS.83 But the relevance of
this theory goes beyond state-based crime. The ICC extended it to
control structures inside non-state actors, such as organized armed
groups. It held that
“this type of structure … is not …inconsistent with the very
varied manifestations of modern-day group criminality wherever
it arises.” 84

The theory has also relevance for business criminality. For instance,
German courts have suggested extending the concept of
organizational control to business enterprises.85 They have argued
that leaders of business organization can be held accountable as
perpetrators for crimes committed by subordinates in corporate
structures, based on the organizational rules and structures found
within corporations.86 The idea of organizational control might for
instance, apply in relations between parent corporations and its
subsidiaries. But in the business context, criteria such as hierarchical
structure, the replaceable nature of company members, or the lawless
nature of the operation are more difficult to establish than in the
context of military or para-military structures.87
82.

See Thomas Weigend, Perpetration through an Organization: The
Unexpected Career of German Legal Concept, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 91,
107 (2011).

83.

Id.

84.

Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, supra note 81, para. 1410. See also
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 1179 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05296.PDF.

85.

Judgment of 26 July 1994 against Former Minister of National Defense
Kebler and Others, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 211, 221 (2011).

86.

Id.

87.

Weigend, supra note 82 at 98.
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2

The controversy over aiding and abetting

Most types of business involvement in international crime happen
indirectly. It is difficult to determine under what circumstances
professional commercial activities may constitute assistance or
otherwise participation in a crime.88 The treatment depends on the
nature of the contribution. Inconsequential or trivial contributions
might not cross the line from a human rights violation to a criminal
act. Criminalization requires a departure from regular commercial
behavior. The treatment might vary according to the nature of the
traded object (e.g., harmless goods vs dangerous, risky or prohibited
goods) or the nexus of the contribution to the relevant crimes (e.g.,
loan to an atrocity regime).
Due to novel human rights and fact-finding mechanisms,
international crimes are relatively well documented internationally.
There are increasing due diligence duties. For instance, Art. 6 (3) of
the Arms Trade Treaty prohibits transfers of arms in cases where a
state has knowledge that the items would be used to commit
genocide, crimes against humanity or certain serious violations of
international humanitarian law.89 It requires risk determinations.90
This changing normative environment has repercussions for standards
of corporate behavior. Certain commercial activities, such as trade
with certain militia forces or regimes with a track record in serious
human rights violations, are more suspect than others. A relevant
criterion for accessorial liability is whether the contribution of the
corporate agent increases the risk in relation to the commission of
crimes.91
The International Commission of Jurists has developed a useful
taxonomy that might provide some guidance. 92 It includes, first of all,
88.

See William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law:
Catching the Accomplices, 83 INT’L REV. Red Cross 439 (2001).

89.

G.A. Res. 69/49, The Arms Trade Treaty art. 6 (Dec. 24, 2014) (“A
State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms
covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or
Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms
or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks
directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other
war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a
Party”).

90.

ANDREW CLAPHAM ET AL., THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: A COMMENTARY
208-209 (Oxford 2016).

91.

KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 165 (Oxford
2013).

92.

See Magda Karagiannakis, Report of the International Commission of
Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International
Crimes, 2 CORP. COMPLICITY & LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 37 (2008),
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the provision of goods or services used in the commission of crimes.93
Classical examples are delivery of chemicals or arms. An early
example is the Trial of Bruno Tesch and two others before the British
Military Court in 1946.94 The two co-accused were convicted for
supplying the poison gas, Zyklon B, to the SS for use in concentration
camps.95 The trial showed they had knowledge that the gas was used
to exterminate detainees. human beings provision of information
which leads to the commission of crimes. Two more recent examples
are the cases against two Dutch businessmen in the Netherlands.96
Cornelius Van Anraat delivered of tons of thiodiglycol (TDG) to the
Saddam Hussein regime which was used to create mustard gas.97
Anraat was convicted as an accessory to war crimes committed
through the use of chemical weapons, since it was evident that the
quantity of TDG was not used for agricultural purposes, but for
military activity.98 In 2017, Guus Kouwenhuven, the president of the
Oriental Timber Company and director of the Royal Timber
Company during the civil war in Liberia, was convicted as an aider or
abettor for supplying weapons, and material, personnel and other
resources to former Liberian President Charles Taylor and his armed
forces between 2000 and 2002.99 The Court held that Mr.
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Vol.2-Corporatelegal-accountability-thematic-report-2008.pdf
[perma.cc/JC8B-ZQEL]
(referring to the ICJ’s analysis of situations in which companies are
alleged to have participated in human rights abuses).
93.

Id.

94.

Id. at 38. British Military Court, The Zyklon B Case, Trial of Bruno
Tesch and Two Others, in LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, VOL. 1 (London:
H.M.S.O., 1947) 93 103

95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98.

Van Anraat was convicted as an accessory to the mustard gas attacks
in the years 1987 and 1988. He was acquitted of complicity in genocide
since it could not be established that he had knowledge of Saddam
Hussein’s intent to destroy (in part) the Kurdish population. See
Prosecutor v. van Anraat, Court of Appeal of The Hague, Judgment, 9
May 2007, at http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/DomCLIC/
Docs/NLP/Netherlands/vanAnraat_Appeal_Judgment_09-052007_EN.pdf.
See generally Harmen van der Wilt, Genocide,
Complicity in Genocide and International versus Domestic Jurisdiction:
Reflections on the van Anraat Case , 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 239 (2006)..

99.

See Prosecutor v. Kouwenhoven, Court of Appeal, Judgment, 21 April
2017,
at
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument
?id=ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2017:1760. See Dieneke De Vos, Corporate
Accountability: Dutch Court Convicts Former “Timber Baron” of War
Crimes in Liberia, F. FOR INT’L CRIM. JUST. NEWSL.: MAY 2017 (Forum
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Kouwenhoven “must have been aware” that “in the ordinary course of
events” the weapons and ammunition he supplied and helped
import would be used.100
Providing information that leads to the commission of crimes may
constitute aiding and abetting. Juan Tasselkraut, a Mercedes Benz
Manager during the military dictatorship in Argentina, was charged
for sharing private information about company officials with the
military regime that led enforced disappearances.101 A similar case was
brought against the Ledesma sugar company. Company officials were
charged for providing personnel that aided in the disappearances of
trade unionists.102
Other forms of assistance include: “the procurement and use of
products or resources (including labor) in the knowledge that the
supply of these resources involves the commission of crimes,” or “the
provision of banking facilities so that the proceeds of crimes can be
deposited.”103
The key problem is that the primary purpose of business activity
is mostly to make economic gain, rather than to commit crimes. The
scope of liability depends on the relevant mens rea. Domestic and
international approaches differ in this respect. For instance, Dutch
Courts held in van Anraat that dolus eventualis of the defendant in
relation to the commission of crimes might be sufficient in relation to
war crimes, but cannot support a conviction for aiding and abetting of
genocide as a special intent crime.104
for Int’l Criminal Justice, The Hague, Neth.), May 2017, at 5,
http://www.iap-association.org/getattachment/
c2983e59-0d5e-465c911d-723bcb05f1ba/FICJ-Newsletter-May-2017.aspx
[http://perma.cc/ALN3-G78X].
100. Id. at 7.
101. Victoria Basualdo et al., The Cases of Ford and Mercedes Benz, in 1
THE ECON. ACCOMPLICES TO THE ARGENTINE DICTATORSHIP 159-73, 168
(Horacio Verbitsky & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky eds., Laura Pérez
Carrara trans., 2016).
102. Press Release, European Ctr. for Constitutional and Human Rights,
Argentine Managers Summoned for Questioning on Complicity in
Dictatorship-Era
Crimes
(May
15,
2012).
https://www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/business-and-humanrights/corporations-and-dictatorships.html?file=tl_files/Dokumente/
Wirtschaft%20und%20Menschenrechte/Ledesma%2C%20press%20releas
e%202012-05-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZN8-YMZ3].
103. Ken Roberts, Corporate Liability and Complicity in International
Crimes, in 1 SUSTAINABLE DEV., INT’L JUST., & TREATY
IMPLEMENTATION 190-211, 197 (Sébastien Jodoin & Marie-Claire
Cordonier Segger, eds.).
104. Harmen van der Wilt, Corporate Criminal Responsibility for
International Crimes: Exploring the Possibilities, 12 CHINESE J. OF INT’L
L. 43, 61 (2013).
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In international criminal law, there has been significant confusion
as to whether aiding and abetting requires knowledge or specific
direction.105 In the Perišić Appeals Judgment, the majority found that
“specific direction” is a necessary element of aiding and abetting.106 It
held that:
“[I]n most cases, the provision of general assistance which could
be used for both lawful and unlawful activities will not be
sufficient, alone, to prove that this aid was specifically directed
to crimes of principal perpetrators. In such circumstances, in
order to enter a conviction for aiding and abetting, evidence
establishing a direct link between the aid provided by an
accused individual and the relevant crimes committed by
principal perpetrators is necessary.”107

The Taylor Appeals judgment and the Sainovic et al. judgment
rejected this reasoning.108 These decisions argued that specific
direction is not an element of aiding and abetting under customary
international law based on an independent review of post-WWII
jurisprudence.109 The trend points thus towards a knowledge-based
approach.
This controversy has direct relevance for business accountability.
A specific direction standard would set a very high threshold for
corporate criminality. It would imply that the corporate agents needs
to share the perpetrator’s intent to commit the underlying crime. This
would make it very difficult to bring cases against corporate actors
that are mainly profiteers of war. The knowledge-based approach is
more realistic. It implies that persons can be responsible as
accomplices if they have knowledge that the main perpetrator uses
the contribution to commit crimes. The relevant knowledge relating
to the impact of contribution is enough even if the corporate agent
merely intends to perform business activities. Tribunals have
105. Charles Chernor Jalloh, International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Taylor,
108 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 58, 64 (2014).
106. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Judgment of Judge
Meron, ¶ 73 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013)
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228_judgement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MH8Z-V9DK].
107. Id. at ¶ 44.
108. Prosecutor v. Šainović, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Judgment of
Judge Daqun ¶ 1649-50 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Jan. 23, 2014) http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/acjug/en/
140123.pdf [perma.cc/UT7Q-NBE5].
109. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Appeals Judgment of
Judge King ¶ 474 (Special Ct. for the Sierra Leone Sep. 26, 2013)
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL03-01-A-1389.pdf [perma.cc/BSN4-UPHT].
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established that the aider and abettor must know the main
perpetrator’s specific intent in the context of specific intent crimes,
such as genocide.110
The ICC Statute is in many ways a sui generis instrument. It has
a specific threshold. It requires that the contribution must be made
for purpose of facilitating the crime.111 Neutral acts of assistance, i.e.
acts that are per se harmless, become criminal only when committed
with the relevant mens rea.112. The implications of this qualifier are
contested. Some argue that this requires shared intent between
accessory and principal.113 Other claim that a certain degree of
knowledge is sufficient to establish the purpose requirement, since it
relates to the consequences of a person’s conduct.114 The purpose
requirement might be satisfied by oblique intent, i.e. certainty that
the crime will occur in the ordinary course of events. This second
interpretation is more in line with the Statute’s mens rea approach in
relation to consequences and existing case law, such as the van
Anraat case.115

110. Prosecutor v. Kristic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, at ¶ 638 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001)
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/krs-tj010802e.pdf.
111. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 69(3)(d), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court if that person…in any other way contributes to
the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be
intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the
criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity
or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the
group to commit the crime . . . .”).
112. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment ¶ 251 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 1991)
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tjug/en/kvo-tj011002e.pdf.
113. MASS. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.100, at 2-3 (2009).
114. Elies van Sliedregt and Alexandra Popova, Interpreting “for the purpose
of facilitating” in Article 25(3)(c), at https://cicj.org/2014/12/
interpreting-for-the-purpose-of-facilitating-in-article-253c/.
See
also
Shriram Bhashyam, Knowledge or Purpose? The Khulumani Litigation
and the Standard for Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 30:1 CARDOZO L. REV. 245, 271 (2008) (arguing that aiding
and abetting liability under the ATCA espouses a knowledge-based
standard under both international law and domestic law).
115. Harmen G. van der Wilt, Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and
International v. Domestic Jurisdiction: Reflections on the van Anraat
Case, 4 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 239, 239 (2006) (discussing the mens rea
requirement for complicity in genocide).
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3.

Common purpose liability

Some systems contain even further-reaching concepts to hold
persons accountable for contributions to collective crime. For
instance, Art. 25 (3) (d) of the ICC Statute provides a specific
liability regime for contribution to a group crime.116 It differs from the
concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise developed by the ad hoc
tribunals.117 It offers a potentially wide basis to hold business leaders
accountable.118 It penalizes “any contribution’ made with (i) ‘the aim
of furthering the criminal activity of criminal purpose of the group’;
or with (ii) ‘the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a
crime.”119 This clause is framed so wide that it has been limited to
“significant” contributions.120 It requires a minimum threshold in
order not criminalize standard business behavior or contributions to
non-criminal activities of collectives.121
4.

Superior responsibility

A final concept to establish individual criminal responsibility is
the concept of superior responsibility. 122 This theory combines

116. Rome Statute, supra text accompanying note 111.
117. Allison M. Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility and the Development of
International Criminal Law (2005) 9 California Law Review 150 (2005);
Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under
the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 109
(2007). See also Sofia Lord, Joint Criminal Enterprise and the
International Criminal Court: A Comparison between Joint Criminal
Enterprise and the Modes of Liability in Joint Commission in Crime
Under the Rome Statute; Can the International Criminal Court Apply
Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Mode of Liability?, at 57 (May 26, 2013)
(unpublished Faculty of Law thesis, Stockholm University) (on file with
Stockholm University).
118. Vest, supra note 77 at 852-853 (providing possible modes of individual
criminal responsibility for business leaders with regard to typical
business activities).
119. Rome Statute, supra text accompanying note 111.
120. Prosecutor v Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10. Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, para. 285. See also Zurab
Sanikidze, The Level of ‘Contribution’ Required Under Article 25(3)(D)
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 83 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 221, 226 (2012) (examining the
contribution threshold in Article 25(3)(d)).
121. THOMAS WEIGEND, How to Interpret Complicity in the ICC Statute,
INT’L CRIM. JUST. BLOG, at 5 (Dec. 15, 2014) http://jamesgstewart.com/
how-to-intepret-complicity-in-the-icc-statute/.
122. See Jenny Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command
Responsibility: From Yamashita to Blaškić and Beyond, 5 J. Int’l Crim.
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omission liability and responsibility for crimes of others based on
failure to exercise proper control in superior-subordinate relationships.
Superior responsibility is grounded in duties of order and obedience in
collective entities.
The concept has its origin in duties of authority in military
command structures.123 It has been extended to other contexts, such
as police structures, private military companies or business
enterprises.124 An early example in the field of business crime is the
Flick case. Flick was convicted as superior because he knew and
approved forced labor, and failed to prevent the acts of his
subordinates.125
Controversy surrounds what types of civilian superior-subordinate
relationships the concept should apply to. In civilian settings, in
particular contractual employer-employee relationships, concepts of
effective control and disciplinary powers of superiors differ from
military settings.126 Civilian superiors do not necessarily enjoy the
same degree of disciplinary power over their subordinates as military
superiors. This difference makes analogies between the two contexts
unreliable. Mere positions of influence within corporate structures
would not suffice to meet the effective control test. An ICTY
Chamber has argued that it suffices that
“the civilian authority, through its position in the hierarchy, is
expected to report whenever crimes are committed, and that, in
the light of this position, the likelihood that those reports will
trigger an investigation or initiate disciplinary or even criminal
measures is extant.”127

The ICTR applied a relaxed threshold in the Musema case.128 The
case concerned the responsibility of Alfred Musama, the director of a
tea company, for participation of his employees in the Rwandan
Just. 638 (2007); Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior
Responsibility 93 AJIL 573 (1999).
123. René Värk, Superior Responsibility, 15 ENDC PROCEEDINGS 143, 144
(2012) (discussing the historical background of superior responsibility).
124. Id.
125. See The Flick Trial, Case No. 48, 9 L. Rep. Trials War Crim. 1 [US Mil.
Trib., Nuremberg] (Apr. 20—Dec. 22, 1949).
126. See Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 281
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tjug/en/brd-tj040901e.pdf.
127. See Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, 15 June 1999,
para. 78.
128. See generally Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment
and Sentence (Jan. 27, 2000), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/
files/case-documents/ictr-96-13/trial-judgements/en/000127.pdf.

117

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018)
Liberals vs Romantics

genocide. The employees used inter alia factory vehicles and property
in the commission of crimes.129 The tribunal derived Musema’s
effective control from his power to appoint and remove employees.130
It argued that he violated his supervisory duties and failed to take
reasonable measures to prevent the crimes.131 This approach has been
criticized for blurring the distinction between psychological pressure,
influence and effective control.132 The reasoning implied that company
managers may face responsibility for mere managerial failures.133 The
crucial point is the knowledge of the crimes and the failure to report
them. As Alexander Zahar has argued:
“[The reasoning] does not distinguish Musema from any
ordinary factor director. Yet it cannot be that all business
managers stand liable to be convicted for international crimes
perpetrated by their employees for the sole reason that they
were only linked to them through commonplace ties of
labour.”134

Companies active in conflict must put in place proper management
structures to ensure that superior exercise due diligence duties and
take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent crimes by
subordinates. Superior responsibility may, for instance, be invoked, if
a business leader fails to prevent his employees from selling weapons
to states or armed groups that are known for their involvement in
international crimes.135 The doctrine should be applied with a certain
degree of caution in business contexts, in order to avoid the risk of
over-criminalization.
Art. 28 (b) of the ICC Statute requires that crimes concern
“activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of
the superior.”136 This implies that crimes of employees that are not
connected to their business functions. i.e. crimes committed outside
working hours or company structures, might not be covered.137

129. Id. at ¶ 901.
130. Id. at ¶ 880.
131. Id. at ¶ 905.
132. Alexander Zahar, Command Responsibility of Civilian Superiors for
Genocide, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 593, 601-02 (2001).
133. Id. at 603.
134. Id. at 602.
135. Vest, supra note 77 at 871.
136. Rome Statute, supra note 111 at art. 28.
137. OTTO TRIFFTERER, THE ROME STATUTE
CRIMINAL COURT 1102 (3d ed. 2016).
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C.

Critiques

Overall, existing law provides multiple legal options to hold
business leaders accountable. There is no shortage of theories to link
corporate agents to international crimes. There are, however, some
structural concerns. The liberal school faces several fundamental
constraints.
One critique is that the path of individual criminal responsibility
focuses the blameworthiness of corporate crime too much on company
individuals.138 It struggles to take into account the collective dynamics
of corporate crime.139 Corporate wrongdoing exceeds the wrongdoing
of its individuals. Extending individual criminal responsibility to all
different types of human rights violations by corporate actors risks
placing excessive culpability on individuals for collective harm.
Exclusive punishment of individual business leaders might produce
judgments that exceed the share and guilt of individuals.140 Violations
of individual business agents are often linked to corporate policies.141
Some of them might not have occurred, had the individuals not been
placed into a specific context by the company. The possibility to
correct this through contextual sentencing considerations are limited.
Due process concerns therefore place certain limits on the liberal
approach.
Second, criminal responsibility of individuals is often
unsatisfactory from a victim’s perspective.142 Individual criminal
convictions can be used for purposes of civil claims, but they often
address only a fraction of the facts and causes of liability.143 The
option to obtain reparations through criminal proceedings is still
138. Al Khayat, supra note 29 at ¶ 82.
139. See generally Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, The Allocation of
Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and
Acccountability, 11 Syd. LR 468 (1988).
140. Al Khayat, supra note 29 at ¶ 83; See also Harmen van der Wilt,
Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes: Exploring
the Possibilities, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 43, 73 (2013)(“Others have
added that collectives have their own social dynamics, enticing
individuals to conquer moral inhibitions. From that perspective, it
would be unfair to single out the individual, as the crimes of the
collective are incommensurate to his contribution and his guilt”).
141. Weigend, supra note 19 at 932.
142. See JAMES GOBERT & MAURICE PUNCH, RETHINKING CORPORATE CRIME
79 (2003)(“Derivative liability, however, can be unsatisfactory for
victims and companies alike. For victims and their families seeking
explanations, the role of the company may not be revealed at trial, for it
is sufficient for the prosecutor to show that an individual has committed
an offence and that the individual is a person for whose acts the
company bears responsibility”).
143. Id.
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limited at the international level.144 This creates critical frictions.
Individuals may bear symbolic responsibility, while corporations are
allowed to retain the profits gained from corporate activities.145

V. Merits and Risks of Corporate Criminal
Responsibility
The option of corporate criminal responsibility remains
underdeveloped in international criminal law. The STL decision marks
an important step to address a structural bias inside international
criminal law against the responsibility of legal persons. It seeks to
counter some of the weaknesses of the liberal approach. It
acknowledges that functional individual accountability alone is not
likely to satisfy the problem of corporate involvement in international
crime.
A. The case for corporate criminal responsibility

The idea of holding companies accountable as collective entities
serves as a corrective from a retributive perspective. It is also
attractive from a restorative justice perspective. Victim participation
in criminal proceedings has increased in past decades.146 This has
created high expectations among victim communities.147 Existing
international and hybrid courts struggle to satisfy demands for
reparation.148 Many defendants before international criminal tribunals
are indigent.149 Reparations awarded by the International Criminal

144. Fisse and Braithwaite, supra note 139 at 475.
145. See Michael McGregor, Ending Corporate Impunity: How to Really Curb
the Pillaging of Natural Resources 42 CASE W. RES. J. OF INT’L L. 469,
490 (2009)(“[B]y focusing on the liability of directors and officers, the
international community is allowing corporations to walk away with
billions of dollars in profits”).
146. See Carolyn Hoyle & Leila Ullrich, New Court, New Justice? The
Evolution of ‘Justice for Victims’ at Domestic Courts and at the
International Criminal Court, 12 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 681, 681-83
(2014)(discussing general shift toward greater victim recognition and
participation and the nature of expanded victim participation,
protections, and reparations).
147. See also Charles P. Trumbull, The Victims of Victim Participation in
International Criminal Proceedings, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 777, 807
(2008)(“[S]ome commentators are concerned that victims may have
unreasonable expectations about the compensation they may receive and
will subsequently feel cheated when they are awarded nominal or
symbolic reparations.”).
148. Trumbull, supra note 147 at 804, 806-807.
149. On the ICC approach, see Carsten Stahn, Reparative Justice after the
Lubanga Appeal Judgment: New Prospects for Expressivism and
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Court, the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia or the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Senegal have remained
largely symbolic.150 Corporate responsibility may offer a new pathway
to award individual or collective reparation that is more
commensurate to the harm caused. As Harmen van der Wilt has
shown, in many cases “where business leaders as natural persons have
been convicted on charges of complicity in international crimes, the
corporation itself would have easily qualified for criminal
responsibility as well”.151
B. Caveats

There are important caveats. The merits of the romantic
approach should not be overstated. Some of the arguments in favor of
broader recognition of corporate criminal responsibility deserve careful
scrutiny.
The first is the deterrence argument. It is often argued that
corporate criminal responsibility sheds greater light on corporate
misconduct and helps deter offences.152 This argument is pertinent in
relation to natural persons. Business agents are even more likely than
other perpetrators of international crimes to consider risks of criminal
prosecution in their cost-benefit analysis.153 But legal persons do not
Participatory Justice or ‘Juridified Victimhood’ by Other Means? 13 J.
Int’l Crim. Just. 801 (2015)..
150. See DRC: For the First Time, ICC Awards Symbolic Individual
Reparations, FIDH: WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Mar.
24,
2017),
https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/international-justice/v
international-criminal-court-icc/for-the-first-time-icc-awards-symbolicindividual-reparations [https://perma.cc/B9VX-2Q8A](describing the
ICC’s first symbolic reparations award to victims in Germain Katanga
case); See also Andrew B. Mamo, History and the Boundaries of
Legality: History Evidence at the ECCC, 29 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 113, 170
(2015)(implying that actual reparations have not been awarded to
victims of the Khmer Rouge, but arguing that such awards would
“redeem [the victims’] struggles in a ways that all the narration and
fact-gathering never could.”).
151. Van der Wilt, supra note 140, at 72.
152. See generally Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and
Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REV. 271, 271 (2008)(“[T]he threat of going out
of business is commonly perceived as providing firms with powerful
incentives to contain misconduct”); see also Van der Wilt, supra note
128, at 273 (“Commentators typically assume that harsh corporate
penalties, including the threat of going out of business, provide firms
with powerful incentive to contain wrongdoing”).
153. See Harmen van der Wilt, Genocide v. War Crimes in the Van Anraat
Appeal, 7 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 557, 567 (2009)(“While the average
perpetrator of international crimes, whether imbued with ideological
fervor or forced by the circumstances to participate in crimes, will
perhaps be uninfluenced by the possibility of trial and punishment, the
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necessarily follow the same behavioral patterns. Deterrence arguments
relating to individuals cannot be automatically transposed to legal
persons. Corporations are highly sensitive to reputational benefits.
Human rights strategies, such as naming and shaming or transparency
of violations may have more immediate effects than criminal justice.
Criminal justice is typically slow and an ultima ratio instrument. Its
added value to deterrence may be more limited than assumed. The
expressivist effect may be more important.
Second, in many situations, corporations are not the masterminds
of international crimes, but rather benefit from a given situation.
Corporate criminal responsibility is thus likely to remain exceptional
in international criminal justice. The STL decision does not go as far
as some business and human rights advocates might have hoped.154
That decision concerned responsibility for contempt of court, rather
than for core crimes under the jurisdiction of the STL.155 It was
visibly driven by the hybrid nature of the tribunal. The criminal
accountability of legal persons under Article 210 (2) of the Lebanese
Criminal Code influenced the choice in favor of corporate criminal
responsibility.156 The Malabo Protocol approaches corporate
misbehavior as a regional problem.157 It is questionable whether a
regional approach does justice to the global nature of corporate
involvement in international crime. The extended scope of corporate
criminal responsibility contrasts with the sweeping immunity
concessions to senior state officials based on their functions during
their term of office.158 This may hamper the prosecution of cases in
which governments are involved in corporate crime.
Third, detaching corporate criminal responsibility too much from
individual criminal responsibility has downsides. As Van der Wilt
rightly points out, “[p]utting the blame exclusively on the corporation
entails the risk that at the end of the day no one is guilty but the
abstract entity.”159 It is thus important to find the synergies and

calculating businessman will probably incorporate the prospect of
criminal prosecution into his cost-benefit analysis”).
154. Kaeb, supra note 1, at 367-368.
155. Prosecutor v. Al Jadeed, STL-14-05/T/CJ, Public Redacted Version of
Judgment, ¶ 5 (Sept. 18, 2015).
156. Id. at ¶ 69-71.
157. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 56 at 5.
158. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 56, at 58. (“Article 46A bis Immunities:
No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against
any serving African Union Head of State or Government, or anybody
acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials
based on their functions, during their tenure of office”).
159. Van der Wilt, supra note 140 at 74.
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connections between individual and collective responsibility.160 The
turn to a fully autonomous organizational model facilitates proof. It
enables judges to infer corporate mens rea from the collective
knowledge of the members of the company or corporate policies. It
recognizes that the blameworthiness of the company may differ from
that of individual agents. It might fill accountability gaps in cases
where no individual cannot or should not he held responsible for the
harm caused. But it stands in contrast to the individual-centered
investigative and trial culture of international criminal courts and
tribunals. The attribution model is still more common in many
domestic
jurisdictions
that
recognize
corporate
criminal
responsibility.161 For efficiency and expressivist purposes, it might be
more feasible to pursue corporate criminal responsibility in
conjunction with individual criminal responsibility.
Fourth, the issue of corporate sanction deserves attention.
Legally, it is perfectly possible to inflict criminal sanctions on
corporations, such as fines and forfeiture measures, or even company
dissolution as ultima ratio. The typical counterargument is that
sanctions may conflict with shareholder innocence.162 This claim is
difficult to make in relation to corporate involvement in international
crimes. Shareholders who fail to check or control company policies are
not truly innocent, but it is questionable whether criminal sanction is
a more effective remedy for victims than civil sanction. The standard
of proof required in criminal proceedings is higher than in civil cases.
There is not a culture of litigation of mass claims. The scope of
charges and incidents prosecuted is typically limited, and in the hands
of the Prosecutor.163 This means that victims have considerably less
control. Cases may be longer, and harder to win. Reparations are
determined in a separate procedure, in which individual interests are
often balanced against collective interests.164

160. See id. at 77 (arguing that “complicity in international crimes of
individual business leaders should . . . be a prerequisite for corporate
criminal liability”).
161. Anca Iulia Pop, Criminal Liability of Corporations – Comparative
Jurisprudence, 25-26 (Spring 2006) (unpublished thesis, Michigan State
University College of Law).
162. Albert Alschuler, Two Ways to Think about the Punishment of
Corporations 13 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Scholarly Commons, Working
Paper No. 192, 2009).
163. Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal
Justice, 3 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 145, 147-48 (2005).
164. Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for
Participation, 32 J. OF L. & SOC’Y 294, 299-300 (2005).
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VI. Concluding Reflections
Investigating and prosecuting business criminality is an important
prerogative. Selectivity has been one of the original sins of
international criminal law.165 The failure to prosecute foreign
businessmen and profiteers who financed and benefited from atrocity
crime has been one of the weaknesses of international criminal justice.
This challenge is gradually being addressed. It is widely recognized
since Nuremberg that the corporate veil does not protect individuals
from criminal responsibility. Despite the developing consensus about
corporate accountability, the tension between liberals and romantics
that has existed since World War II has never fully gone away.
Modern criminal law doctrine remains largely dominated by a
focus on the role of individuals in collective crime.166 It provides
extensive, and sometimes maybe even overbroad concepts to hold
individuals accountable in collective structures.167 Limited efforts were
made to develop viable counter-models.168 The idea that crimes
against international law can be committed by ‘abstract legal entities’
was only re-considered recently.169 The famous Nuremberg dictum is
open to challenge. Corporate ethos is often a significant part of the
conduct of individual agents. But the question as to how corporate
responsibility can be addressed best is still open.
The idea of corporate criminal responsibility should not be
romanticized. The benefits of criminal responsibility over civil liability
or human rights accountability are not always fully clear. It is
certainly too early to claim that corporate criminal responsibility is a
general principle of law. The ILC has been visibly more cautious in its
draft articles on crimes against humanity. It recognizes the
responsibility of legal persons, but leaves states the option to choose
between criminal, civil or administrative responsibility.170

165. Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at
the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 265, 267
(2012).
166. Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11
CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 694, 720 (2011).
167. Id. at 738.
168. Marion Smiley, Collective Responsibility, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHIL. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collectiveresponsibility/.
169. Silvia Rodríguez-López, Criminal Liability of Legal Persons for Human
Trafficking Offenses in International and European Law, 1 J. OF
TRAFFICKING & HUM. EXPLOITATION 95, 96 (2017).
170. See above note 16.
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The road has been paved by trial and error. The French proposal
for corporate responsibility before the ICC very restrictive.171 The idea
to insist on conviction of an individual before the pursuit of corporate
criminal responsibility would have posed many practical obstacles for
the Court. The Malabo Protocol moved to the other extreme. It
disassociates corporate criminal responsibility fully from individual
criminal responsibility. This poses a different set of problems.172
The way forward requires less romanticism and more realism.
Both individual and corporate responsibility are needed. But the
appropriate space of corporate criminal responsibility needs to be
defined better. The concept is still most developed in domestic
jurisdictions.173 Its role at the international level is likely to remain
modest. The main challenge is to develop the interplay between
individual and collective responsibility, and to assess more carefully in
what areas and in what forums collective responsibility may be
pursued best.
The role of the ICC will remain limited. The effect of the 2016
Policy Paper should not be overstated. It is unlikely that there will be
a broad range of new cases regarding corporate involvement in crime.
But the transparency and stigma of communications may have a
certain alert effect, with reputational costs for companies. It might
have an indirect effect on compliance strategies, not necessarily
through trials, but through the shadow of potential cases and the
advocacy of civil society organizations.

171. Richard T. De George, Peter French, Collective and Corporate
Responsibility, 21 NOÛS 448, 449 (1987) (reviewing PETER FRENCH,
COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984)).
172. Briefing Paper from Dr. Joanna Kyriakakis on Corporate Criminal
Liability at the African Criminal Court to the ACRI Meeting, ¶ 14-15
(2016).
173. Pop, supra note 161, at 49-50.
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